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6Executive summary | Note from the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
The financial and economic crisis in the aftermath of 2008 is 
unique for several reasons: its depth, its speed and its global-
entanglement. Simultaneous economic decline in many 
economies around the globe sent out political shockwaves. 
In Europe, the crisis served as a wake-up call. Policymakers 
responded to the social and political insecurity triggered by 
economically unsound practices with solidarity and with 
EU-scepticism. The recession confronted Euro zone countries 
with a number of similar problems, although each was embedded 
in its own set of country-specific challenges. The tools with 
which each began to counteract the financial and sovereign debt 
crisis differed. This policy brief examines the Portuguese path to 
recovery. It outlines some of the great recession’s main impacts 
on the country’s labour market, as well as analyses the path it 
has taken to restore sustainable jobs. 
In sum, Portugal’s recovery offers four lessons for policy-makers 
in the EU: 1) to include labour market reforms in any adjustment 
programme, 2) to monitor closely wage-setting systems, 3) to cut 
the tax burden on labour input, and 4) to increase (European) 
support for low wage earners. 
Executive summary 
The policy brief “The Portuguese Economic Crisis: Policies and 
Outcomes” is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s ongoing work 
to contribute to an evidence-based debate on how to strengthen 
Europe’s economies and how to improve the economic governance 
of the European Union. Even before putting countries like Greece 
at the brink of default in 2012, the crisis had transformed into a 
political one too, and fuelled an unhealthy antagonism of Euro 
zone creditor and debtor countries. 
In September 2014, the Bertelsmann Stiftung launched an 
EU-wide social justice index for EU member states. The Social 
Inclusion Monitor revealed a significant decline not only in 
absolute terms but also a widening gap between northern and 
southern EU countries. 
In November 2014, the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Jacques 
Delors Institute Berlin presented a joint study, “Repair and 
Prepare: Strengthening Europe’s Economies after the Crisis”. 
Its policy recommendations aim to allow Europe to repair the 
economic and political damage wrought by the ongoing euro 
crisis and to prepare for future shocks. 
More information available at: 
https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/our-projects/
strengthening-and-connecting-europe/
and http://www.social-inclusion-monitor.eu 
Gütersloh, February 2015
“Portugal is in serious trouble. Productivity growth 
is anemic. Growth is very low. The budget deficit is 
large. The current account deficit is very large … In the 
absence of policy changes, the most likely scenario is 
one of competitive disinflation, a period of sustained 
high unemployment until competitiveness has been 
reestablished.” 
Olivier Blanchard, 2007
currently Chief Economist, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington D.C
Note from the  
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
71. The Boom and the Bust
The Portuguese economy was in serious trouble well before 
being hit by the financial crisis. Severe macroeconomic 
imbalances were transparent both in terms of persistent large 
external deficits and budget deficits. Underlying these worrying 
outcomes, Portugal observed low rates of economic growth and 
of total factor productivity growth for a long period of time. 
The bust followed a boom (fig. 1). Earlier, low interest rates, 
made possible by being part of the Euro zone, fueled an 
economic expansion that was supported by high expectations 
regarding future productivity growth and was financed by 
debt (fig. 2 and 3). The increase in demand pushed wages well 
above productivity levels, and engendered a severe loss of 
competitiveness (see fig. 4) (Franco, 2003). 
1. The Boom and the Bust
Figure 1: Economic Growth 
Source: INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística).
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Figure 2: External Deﬁcit (in percentage of GDP)
Source: INE. 
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Figure 3: Budget Deﬁcit (in percentage of GDP)
Source: INE.
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81. The Boom and the Bust
The Portuguese economy was set to enter a painful process 
of competitive disinflation. But, in 2015, the macroeconomic 
prospects are much less clouded. External imbalances are 
considerably reduced, public finances are viably improved, and 
the financial conditions are stabilized. Portugal is following a 
path comparable to the one successfully pursued by Spain and 
Ireland and is regaining gradually its economic competiveness.
But economic trouble was not confined to macroeconomic 
misalignments. Two other chronic problems hampered, the 
Portuguese economy in prior decades. 
First, the human capital investments and thus skills available 
to the Portuguese labour market were low. This was due to 
an under-investment in education. At the turn of the century, 
Portugal had one of the lowest rates of education achievement 
among the OECD countries (fig. 5). Low education translates into 
low productivity growth. Second, the economy was served by ill-
conceived labour market institutions, in particular those related 
to job protection and wage setting, which over the years played 
a significant role in destabilizing the Portuguese economy. One 
indication that the economy was faltering was when Portugal’s 
sovereign bond rating was cut in summer 2010. 
Figure 4: Unit Labor Costs 
Source: INE. 
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91. The Boom and the Bust
Figure 5: Percentage of tertiary-educated adults in 2000 and 2012 
Source: OECD. Table A1.4a. See Annex 3 for notes (www.oecd.org/edu/eag.htm).
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Countries are ranked in ascending order of the percentage of 25–64 year-olds who have attained tertiary education in 2012 (or latest available year). 
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2. The Adjustment Programme
2. The Adjustment Programme
Over the course of the crisis, the Portuguese economy faced 
severe headwinds. First, the macroeconomic adjustment took 
place at a time when the EU was facing a recession. Second, 
inflation rates were very low making wage adjustments much 
harder due to downward nominal wage rigidity. And third, 
the regulatory requirements of the international assistance 
programme necessary to reestablish financial stability generated 
severe credit restrictions to (much indebted) Portuguese non-
financial firms. 
In this unfavorable environment, perhaps attainable fiscal 
targets, that facilitated success at each evaluation of the 
adjustment programme would have better fostered recovery, and 
attenuated “adjustment fatigue”.2 The relaxation of fiscal targets 
in exchange for significant structural reforms, not only would 
have made those reforms more likely to be executed, but also 
would have boosted their political support. A remarkable example 
is, precisely, the implementation of the fiscal devaluation.
2  It can be safely argued that, at the early stage of the programme, the failure to 
attain the announced fiscal targets seriously depreciated the, initially high, social 
and political support for the adjustment. 
The government had two objectives in responding to the 
financial and sovereign debt crisis: to maintain the stability 
of the Portuguese financial sector and to buffer the domestic 
impact of the crisis. Yet increased public spending and reduced 
public revenue made access to international financial markets 
increasingly difficult, and (May 2011) led to an economic rescue 
plan agreed upon the Portuguese government, the European 
Union, the European Central Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund.1 Structural reforms are one essential ingredient 
of this plan; institutional reforms, namely labour market 
institutions, are also part of it. 
The plan’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) imposed 
ambitious budgetary targets (very likely due to the limitations 
of the financial package that was made available), forced a 
demanding deleverage of the banking system, and specified a 
long and detailed list of reforms across all areas of government.
But a critical evaluation of the MOU should not overlook the 
fact that a (planned and agreed) key policy – a significant fiscal 
devaluation – failed to materialize. Indeed, the plan to reduce 
social security taxes and compensate the loss in fiscal revenues 
through an increase in consumption taxes (VAT taxes), – which 
was classified by the IMF as a “game changer” – unfortunately 
failed, to gain political support. Although it is debatable, if 
indeed a fiscal devaluation can mimic the changes in relative 
prices similar to an exchange rate devaluation, there is general 
agreement that it can contain job destruction, and sustain job 
creation.
1  In EU jargon “Economic Adjustment Programme”. Irrespective of the exit from 
this financial assistance programme in May 2014, Portugal’s budget is still being 
monitored through the excessive deficit procedure, the so-called corrective arm of 
the stability and growth pact (Art. 126, Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union – TFEU).
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3. The Memorandum of Understanding and Labour Market Reforms
contracts and the unemployed) a number of proposals were 
agreed to reduce firing costs. In practice, the changes in the 
unemployment insurance rules and in severance payments did 
not apply to rights already accrued by the workers, meaning 
that it will take a long time to observe its full impact. 
One policy that was openly discussed and partially supported 
in the MOU, one that would target labour market fragmentation 
more efficiently, was the introduction of a single contract for 
new-hires (of the type recently approved in Italy), offering less 
protection than open-ended contracts but significantly more 
than fixed-term contracts. Understandably, this proposal was 
objected to by the social partners and failed to gain the necessary 
political support in order to be legislated.
As mentioned above, the key element of the programme was the 
fiscal devaluation. In particular, it was expected to have a positive 
effect on employment, containing job destruction and favoring 
job creation. Since the planned reduction in social security 
taxes was rather substantial (representing 2 percent of GDP, 
according to the IMF) significant positive employment effects 
were expected. High estimates of labour demand elasticities 
for the Portuguese economy were an additional reason to be 
hopeful. However, political resistance by Portuguese decision 
makers (and lack of common will among the Troika) during the 
early phase of the programme, largely based on the uncertainty 
that consumption taxes could indeed compensate the loss in 
social security taxes, and a politically unfeasible design of the 
measure at a later stage, led decision makers to abandon this 
policy.
The MOU measures dedicated to the labour market reflected the 
understanding that Portuguese labour market institutions were 
poorly designed, contributing to the dysfunctionality of the labour 
market (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). In effect, international 
comparisons highlight the fact that job protection in Portugal 
used to stand out as an extreme case, as did unemployment 
protection, and nominal wage rigidity (Dickens, et al., 2007). The 
rigidity of labour legislation has had its consequences: Portugal 
is the OECD country where the average unemployment period is 
the longest, where the arrival rate of job offers is the lowest, and 
where the share of temporary work is the second highest. The 
MOU aimed to gradually move Portuguese legislation closer to 
the mainstream European practice. 
The evolution of wages over the previous decade was misaligned 
with that of the feasible wages – that is, those wage levels that 
could be supported by a balanced economy – generating a 
serious external competitiveness problem. For this reason, the 
MOU includes a general concern about containing or reducing 
labour costs: reducing social security contributions, reducing 
overtime payments, freezing the minimum wages and public 
sector wages, reducing severance payments, and reducing the 
amount and duration of unemployment benefits. 
The most significant change, however, was related to the 
mechanisms of wage setting, through the controls imposed on 
collective agreements extensions with the whole industry; on the 
obligation of negotiators to reveal their true constituency; and 
on the possibility for companies to negotiate wage agreements 
at the firm level. Highlighting the need to move away from 
the labour market division of “insiders” (workers with open-
ended contracts) and “outsiders” (workers with temporary 
3. The Memorandum of Understanding and Labour Market Reforms
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4. Labour Market Outcomes
At the end of the adjustment programme in 
May 2014, Portugal faces the serious economic 
challenge of reducing unemployment rates, in 
particular, youth unemployment and long-term 
unemployment rates. The sharp decline in 
hiring rates, which is a stylized fact of the great 
recession in many economies, also impacted 
in the Portuguese labour market, affecting 
severely the transition from unemployment 
of young job seekers. Currently, youth 
unemployment rates in Portugal (around 33 
percent) are comparable to the ones observed 
in Italy but not as dramatic as those of Spain 
or Greece. 
Portugal is recovering from a severe recession 
that generated historically high unemployment 
rates – in 2012 the unemployment rate reached 
17.7 percent. Unemployment rates increased 
very rapidly, but are also decreasing at a fast 
rate (fig. 6).3 This evolution reflects not only the 
depth of the recession, but also the underlying 
macroeconomic dynamics. As compared to 
past recessions (fig. 7), it is clear that during 
the current recession the unemployment rate 
increased more, and faster. It remains to be 
seen whether this means that recovery will 
follow the same pattern or not: comparing 
3  There is a possibility that, due to methodological reasons, 
the Employment Survey may have overestimated the 
incidence of unemployment during the early phase of the 
Portuguese crisis (Economic Bulletin, Bank of Portugal, 
2014).
4. Labour Market Outcomes
Figure 6: Unemployment rate 
Source: INE.
(quarterly data; percentage of civilian labour force)
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Figure 7: Unemployment rate behaviour in Portugal over the last 
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4. Labour Market Outcomes
Figure 8: Employment behaviour in Portugal over the last 
recessions 
Quarters from the ﬁrst quarter (t) when employment started to decline
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the magnitude and speed of downwards 
employment adjustment during the current 
and past recessions is not straightforward 
as the size of the underlying shocks are not 
similar. Likewise, the speed of the recovery 
cannot be simply extrapolated from past 
recovery patterns due to the fact the labour 
market institutions were reformed in the 
meantime and the results of such reforms are 
not yet known. An identically worrying pattern 
is found for the evolution of employment rate 
(fig. 8).
Notwithstanding, it is still worth noticing that 
adjustment to the previous recession (2003) 
followed a very different path than before: 
24 months after the beginning of the 2003 
recession, the unemployment rate was still 
three percentage points above its initial level, 
whereas in the past the corresponding figure 
was around one percentage point. This means 
that, even before the current recession, the 
Portuguese economy was not able to restore 
the pre-recession level of unemployment. 
Predicting whether the exit path from the 
current recession will be similar to what was 
observed in the past is akin to predict whether 
the reform of the institutions will work as 
expected or not.
14
4. Labour Market Outcomes
During the nineties, the Portuguese labour market was already 
conspicuous for exhibiting high mean unemployment duration. 
In comparison with the US, Portugal presented three times longer 
unemployment durations (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). During 
the second half of the 2000s, mean unemployment duration 
increased significantly and reached historically high values in 2014 
(fig. 9). This indication suggests that long-term unemployment, 
and thus, structural unemployment, is playing now a larger role 
than before. Indeed, the incidence of unemployment appears to be 
the main factor responsible for the increase in the risk of poverty 
in recent years (Schraad-Tischler and Kroll, 2014).4
In Carneiro, Portugal and Varejão (2014), the authors explored 
three different channels that may have amplified the response 
of employment to the great recession: the credit channel, the 
wage rigidity channel, and the labour market segmentation 
channel. They uncovered convincing evidence that the severity 
of credit constraints played a significant role in the current job 
destruction process. Wage rigidity was seen to be associated 
with lower net job creation and higher failure rates of firms. 
Finally, labour market segmentation seemed to have favored a 
stronger job destruction that was facilitated by an increasing 
number of temporary workers. I will explore the two crucial 
channels in more detail.
4  The social justice index for Portugal’s Labour market dropped from 6.14 in 2008 
to 4.86 in 2014 on a ten point scale. According to Statistics Portugal, the risk of 
poverty increased from 18.0 percent in 2010 to 19.5 in 2013. In terms of income 
distribution, the Gini coefficient increased modestly from 34.2 to 34.5 during the 
same period.
Figure 9: Average Unemployment Duration 
Source: INE. 
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5. Credit Channel and Job Destruction 
5. Credit Channel and Job Destruction
The unfortunate combination of the financial crisis, the 
sovereign debt crisis, and regulatory requirements of the 
international assistance programme necessary to reestablish 
financial stability generated severe credit restrictions to the 
Portuguese non-financial firms. Fig. 10 exhibits a sharp dive in 
the growth rate of credit granted to non-financial corporations 
(NFC). The decline was even much more pronounced for SMEs. 
Equally worrying was the decoupling of Portuguese interest 
rates on new loans to firms from selected European economies 
illustrated in fig. 11. This means that Portuguese firms have been 
supporting financial costs well above those of their European 
competitors. 
One can wonder whether this indication of severe credit 
constraints faced by Portuguese firms may be linked to the 
destruction of jobs. Carneiro, Varejão and Portugal (2014) 
shed some light on the nexus between the firms’ financial 
conditions and employment. They argue, using micro data for 
the period of the crisis, that inward displacement of supply of 
credit was associated with higher firm failure rates and lower 
net job creation rates. These two pieces, taken together, can 
be interpreted as evidence that credit shortage confronted by 
Portuguese firms played a non-negligible role in the process that 
accentuated job destruction.
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Figure 10: Credit ﬂow growth: non-ﬁnancial 
corporations
Source: INE (quarterly data). 
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5. Credit Channel and Job Destruction
Figure 11: Interest rates on new business loans to NFC 
Source: Source: ECB.
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6. Wage Channel and Job Destruction: The Role of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
The notable feature of the wage setting mechanism in recent 
years is the evidence of extreme nominal wage rigidity. 
This outcome is the result of a conflation of severe economic 
contraction and a low rate of inflation. A revealing exercise is 
to contrast the nominal wage change distribution in 2012 with 
that in 1984 when the economic recession was accompanied by 
high inflation. The respective wage change distributions (of job 
stayers) are provided in panels (a) and (b) of fig. 12. We focused 
on the base wage since this measure is more closely related to 
the theoretical notion of a negotiated wage rate. 
On the wage-side, the recession was characterized by a huge 
increase in the share of jobs that are paid at the legal minimum 
wage and by an abnormal incidence of nominal wage freezes. 
Every year in Portugal collective agreements update the wage 
floors of around 30,000 job titles (Carneiro et al., 2014; Martins, 
2014). Given the widespread use of extension mechanisms 
(“portarias de extensão”) the coverage of bargained wages is 
close to 90 percent of all dependent workers in the private sector. 
This occurs despite the fact that the union density rates are very 
low (around 10 percent according to Portugal and Vilares, 2013).
6.  Wage Channel and Job Destruction:  
The Role of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
Figure 12: Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in High and Low Inﬂation Regimes 
Source: Quadros de Pessoal 1984, Relatorio Único 2012.
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6. Wage Channel and Job Destruction: The Role of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
nominal wage increases, in the form of a sharp decline in new 
collective agreements, legal limits placed on the extension of 
such agreements, and a freeze on minimum wage hikes. In 
short, 2012 was a time in which incipient downward nominal 
wage rigidity became truly binding, the full consequences of 
which are to be felt in the future. These consequences include 
job destruction (Carneiro, Portugal and Varejão, 2014), pent-up 
wage deflation (Yellen, 2014), and only then, possibly, a crisis in 
industrial relations.
Beginning with panel (a) of the figure, it can be seen that a 
tiny (2 percent) proportion of workers faced nominal cuts and 
a discernible share of worker (5 percent) experienced a wage 
freeze. However, the large majority of workers had nominal 
wage increases but real wage cuts. Only 18 percent of workers 
enjoyed real wage increases – those located in the wage change 
distribution to the right of the inflation rate, identified by the 
vertical red line. The share of workers located between the two 
vertical lines (74 percent) provides a rough indication of real 
wage contractual flexibility in the face of recession. On net, 
therefore one can speak of real wages having declined by 7.4 
percent in 1984, much more than the decline in real GDP (-1 
percent). Meantime, the unemployment rates increased very 
modestly from 8.2 to 8.5 percent.
The drama of contemporary wage adjustment is illustrated in 
panel (b) of the figure. The wage change distribution nearly 
collapses at zero percent nominal wage change. Fully 86 percent 
of the workers experienced real wage decreases. Because 
the inflation rate was very low, the margin of downward real 
wage adjustment that would not imply nominal wage cuts was 
highly circumscribed. In these circumstances, a huge fraction 
of workers experienced nominal wage freezes (76 percent), an 
outcome without parallel in other developed economies. Overall, 
real wages fell by 1.3 percent in 2012 whereas GDP declined 
by 3 percent. Meantime, the unemployment rates increased 
substantially from 12.7 to 15.5 percent. It seems clear that, in 
the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity, a low inflation 
regime translated into protecting wages over job owners. Some 
other reasons why nominal wage were effectively frozen have 
to do with the notion that “upward nominal wage rigidity” was 
contained. They include the mechanisms that generate automatic 
19
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7.  Lessons from the Portuguese Adjustment Programme:  
A Labour Economist Perspective
played by the workers councils in the Portuguese legal framework 
seriously dampens any moves toward a decentralized (firm 
based) system of wage negotiations. In this framework, it seems 
justifiable to limit the extension of wage agreements to criteria 
based on the representativeness of the negotiation partners. The 
praised German experience (Dustmann et al., 2014) favoring 
opting out clauses and decentralized mechanisms where worker 
councils play an important role should also be given serious 
consideration, even though the governance structure of the 
Portuguese system of industrial relations is, unlike the German 
one, firmly rooted in legislation and overwhelmingly governed 
by the political process.
Tax cuts on labour inputs could benefit 
workers
It is not too late to reconsider the alleviation of the tax burden on 
labour. The debate on wage adjustments has not valued enough 
the possibility that labour cost savings can be achieved through 
means other than nominal wage cuts. In an environment of 
low inflation, in particular, it would be important to consider 
reductions in payroll taxes (or, more to the point, fiscal credits 
for earned income) benefiting mainly low wage (low skilled) 
workers. In other economies, in particular in the US, this 
kind of policy proved highly effective moving low qualified 
workers out of the inactivity trap. It is likely to be even more 
promising in Europe where the combination of wage rigidities 
and a low inflation regime tend to feed persistent structural 
unemployment. 
Severe macroeconomic imbalances and inappropriate labour 
market institutions impaired the Portuguese economy’s ability 
to cope with the consequences of the 2008 global crisis. As the 
financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis, the labour 
market response originated severe social costs associated with 
high job destruction rates, record high unemployment rates, and 
massive long-term unemployment. In other words, the depth of 
the recession exceeded the resilience of the labour market, i.e., its 
ability to weather economic downturns with limited social costs.
A recovery programme must include jobs
The adjustment programme, while successful in other 
dimensions, was rather disappointing in terms of employment 
outcomes. As argued above, the needed reduction in labour 
costs to restore competitiveness was limited by the failure to 
implement the planned fiscal devaluation. The labour market 
reforms approximated modestly the Portuguese legal framework 
closer to the EU mainstream practices. It is too soon to evaluate 
the full impact of those reforms. But, in our view, major changes 
are still needed, in particular with respect to the wage setting 
system.
Wage-setting systems still need to be 
reformed
Extensive empirical evidence call into question the functionality 
of the architecture of the Portuguese wage setting system. In 
particular, it raises very serious concerns with respect to the 
widespread use of extension mechanisms. Also, the limited role 
20
7. Lessons from the Portuguese Adjustment Programme: A Labour Economist Perspective
Finally, the recent decision of the European Central Bank starting 
a Quantitative Easing (QE) programme is likely to sustain a 
more favourable macroeconomic environment for the European 
economy. The QE in the US and the UK is commonly praised 
as instrumental in the economic recovery. But, in my view, it 
is not clear how to disentangle the role played by monetary 
policy from the flexibility of the labour markets. Or whether the 
transmission of monetary policy is favoured by wage flexibility. 
Nevertheless, as argued above, in countries where downward 
nominal wage rigidity is widespread, higher inflation certainly 
facilitates real wage adjustments.
More support for low wage earners
A European programme subsidizing low wage earners, 
which also has merits in terms of its desirable cyclical and 
redistribution properties, would make an effective complement 
of a basic European system of unemployment insurance. It is our 
contention that such programmes may well prove to offer better 
economic and social returns than the conventional European 
programmes.
Where are we now?
The economic recession is over, unemployment is declining at 
a healthy pace, and external competitiveness was restored at 
surprising speed. It is safe to say that the most painful part of 
the road to economic recovery was overcome. 
Nevertheless, structural reforms in the product and labour 
markets still need to be more thoroughly addressed. In particular, 
as in other southern countries, the wage setting system is a 
(the) key factor responsible for high and persistent structural 
unemployment rates. 
New improvements regarding the architecture of the EMU, 
enhancing the ability to anticipate and react in a flexible 
way to a future crisis, are certainly welcome. In this vein, a 
coherent framework of “reform, investment, and institutional 
improvements” of the type proposed by a recent study of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung and Jacques Delors Institute (2014) merits 
consideration. 
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